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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CERCLA ENFORCEMENT: 
TERMINOLOGY AND MEANING OF “TREATMENT” ARRANGER 
LIABILITY 
Daniel J. DePasquale * 
 
CERCLA arranger liability was forever changed by the 
Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009).  In the aftermath, 
EPA has been hamstrung with the difficulty of substantiating a 
Potentially Responsible Party’s (“PRP”) intent to arrange for 
disposal of a hazardous substance, as well as attempting to 
overcome the ever-increasing scientific capabilities of PRPs to 
demonstrate that proportionality of damages is appropriate for 
a given Superfund site.  This Article is the first in depth analysis 
teasing apart what it means for a PRP to arrange for disposal, as 
opposed to arrange for treatment—both found under CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(3)—and to establish that the use of the treatment 
terminology could strengthen the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) enforcement efficiency and effectiveness. 
In particular, this Article opines on the following: (1) Congress 
included the treatment term because the treatment of 
hazardous substances inherently generate the possibility of 
Superfund sites; (2) Congress intended liability to attach to the 
transferor anytime the selling party intends—whether implicitly 
or explicitly—to alter the hazardous substance through some 
process to make it more useful or reuseable, and that process 
was the proximate cause of the release of hazardous waste at 
the site; and (3) attaching liability under the treatment term is 
an easier standard to meet and would result in an increased 
percentage of successful CERCLA enforcement actions and 
contribution claims.  To illustrate, this Article discusses two 
real-world scenarios in an effort to shed light on situations in 
which treatment arranger liability could and should be utilized 
as a litigation tactic over disposal arranger liability. 
* 2016 Western New England University School of Law, graduate.  I would like to 
thank the members of the Western New England Law Review for their hard work and 
diligence during the editing process.  A special thank you, as well, to my family for their 
unwavering support and encouragement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act1 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”) is a highly 
developed statutory scheme passed by Congress in 1980.  This 
legislation was enacted to address health and environmental risks 
resulting from continuing industrial pollution from chemical spills 
and increasing amounts of abandoned hazardous dump sites.2  
CERCLA empowers the President “to command government 
agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.”3  
The statute holds all Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRP”) 
strictly liable, many of them by way of joint and several liability.4 
Section 107(a) of CERCLA sets out the means by which a 
person or corporate entity can be found liable for cleanup costs of 
hazardous waste sites.5  Liability attaches to the following: (1) the 
current owner or operator of the contaminated premises; (2) the 
owner or operator of the contaminated premises at the time of the 
disposal of the hazardous substance; (3) generators and parties who 
arranged for treatment or disposal of hazardous substances; and (4) 
transporters that select the disposal site.6  These categories can be 
discussed endlessly, as each is more complicated than meets the 
eye.  Nevertheless, the focus of this Article is on the third 
category—arranger liability.7  More specifically, this Article will 
1.  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
§§ 101–175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2014) [hereinafter CERCLA §§ 101–175]. 
2. See id.; United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998); Exxon Corp. v. 
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 358–59 (1986).  The statute was enacted in direct response to Love 
Canal, in Niagara, New York, and the Valley of Drums in Brooks, Kentucky.  See 
GIBBS M. LOIS, LOVE CANAL: MY STORY (Grove Press, 1982); see also EPA 
Superfund Program: A.L. Taylor (Valley of Drums), Brooks, KY, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0402072 (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
3.  Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994); see CERCLA 
§§ 101–175. 
4.  See generally CERCLA §§ 101–175.  CERCLA does not explicitly state that 
there is joint and several liability; however, courts have readily implemented it as per 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining how there were joint and several liability provisions 
in Senate CERCLA drafts previously and how those provisions were stripped with the 
final amendments to the bill in order to put the emphasis on common law principles to 
determine on a case-by-case basis when a party should be held joint and severally 
liable). 
5.  CERCLA § 107(a). 
6.  CERCLA § 107(a); see generally Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (clarifying transporter liability within CERCLA). 
7.  See CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
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delve into what it means to arrange for treatment of hazardous 
waste.8  The topic of treatment-based arranger liability is rather 
unique, as most articles—and cases for that matter—tackle 
arranger liability through the lens of disposal.9  There is a dearth of 
academic scholarship on treatment arranger liability.  In fact, this is 
the first academic Article to focus on treatment arranger liability 
and pinpoint the differences between treatment, as opposed to 
disposal arranger liability under CERCLA. 
Before examining the specifics of treatment-based arranger 
liability, it is first important to understand Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. v. United States.10  Burlington 
Northern is a 2009 Supreme Court case that has had significant 
implications for CERCLA arranger liability.11  The case involved 
the sale of numerous hazardous chemicals by Shell Oil Company 
(“Shell”) to Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B & B”) via a common carrier 
service.12  Spills and leaks of the chemicals often occurred during 
the delivery of these chemicals.13  Shell took notice of this problem, 
and took steps in an attempt to diminish the occurrence of spills.14  
Even with Shell’s various attempts, B & B continued to conduct 
sloppy operations at the site, and eventually became insolvent in 
1989.15 
The Supreme Court made two important holdings in the 
Burlington Northern case,16 but for purposes of this Article 
emphasis will be placed on one of these holdings.  The Supreme 
8.  CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
9. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3); Heidi Rasmussen, Re-“Arranging” CERCLA 
Liability: What is the State of Arranger Liability Post-Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railroad Company v. United States, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 382–83 (2015); Marc P. 
Lawrence, To Arrange or Not to Arrange: Intent is the Question, MICH. B.J., Oct. 
2009, at 48; Alexandra E. Shea, CERCLA Arranger Liability and the Intent to Dispose 
of Hazardous Waste, FED. LAW., July 2012, at 42.   
10.  556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. at 602–03. 
13.  Id. at 604. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. at 604–05. 
16.  The other holding—which has equal, if not greater implications—upholds the 
use of proportioning cost for a responsible party in certain cases.  Id. at 613–15.  The 
Court reasoned that the defendant can avoid joint and several liability if—and only if—
they can prove that a “reasonable basis for apportionment exists.”  Id. at 614.  In 
contrast, if multiple causes create a single, indivisible harm, joint and several liability is 
applied—thus all defendants are held liable for the entire harm.  Id. at 614–15.  In this 
case, the Supreme Court upheld apportionment of nine percent for the railroad 
company.  Id. at 618–19. 
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Court opined that Shell was not liable for arranging for the disposal 
of hazardous substances under CERCLA § 107(a).17  The Court 
began its analysis by asserting that if a party enters into a 
transaction for the sole purpose of discarding a no longer useful 
hazardous substance, that party is clearly liable under CERCLA § 
107(a).18  This a clear-cut instance of a PRP arranging for the 
disposal of a hazardous substance.19  On the other end of the 
spectrum, if a party sells a new and useful product and that product 
later—unbeknownst to the original seller—causes contamination 
during disposal, there is no liability to the seller under 107(a).20  
What remains unclear is assignment of liability when the seller has 
knowledge of the contamination, but the seller’s intent is 
unknown.21  The Court determined that in such cases, arranging for 
disposal liability “requires a fact intensive inquiry that looks 
beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a 
‘disposal’ or a ‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement 
was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s 
strict-liability provisions.”22  This new approach has constrained the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) ability to bring 
enforcement actions against arrangers for disposal, as the requisite 
intent is significantly harder to demonstrate than the mere 
knowledge that eventual disposal would indeed take place. 
This Article utilizes the Burlington Northern framework and 
other case law to analyze the meaning of the phrase “arranged 
for . . . treatment” within CERCLA § 107(a)(3).23  Specifically, this 
Article intends to answer the following questions: (1) why did 
Congress include this phrase; (2) what types of transactions did 
Congress intend to have liability attach to the transferor; and (3) 
whether courts analyze “arranged for . . . treatment” similarly or 
differently than “arranged for disposal,” which is also in CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(3).24  This Article will survey CERCLA Congressional 
records and the few instances that courts have scrutinized 
treatment arranger liability, in order to better construe how EPA—
17.  Id. at 613. 
18.  Id. at 609–10. 
19.  See id. 
20.  Id.; see Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); 
see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Charmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
21.  Burlington, 556 U.S. at 610. 
22.  Id. 
23.  See CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
24.  CERCLA § 107(a)(3).   
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and private parties involved in CERCLA contribution claims—can 
utilize the term treatment in select enforcement actions. 
This Article will ultimately conclude that: (1) Congress 
included this phrase because treatment of hazardous substances 
inherently generates the possibility of Superfund sites; (2) Congress 
intended liability to attach to the transferor anytime the selling 
party intends—whether implicitly or explicitly—to alter the 
hazardous substance through some process to make it more useful 
or reuseable, and that process was the proximate cause of the 
release of hazardous waste at the site; and (3) while some courts 
have analyzed the terms treatment and disposal within the same 
analysis—provided they are not mutually exclusive terms—it is 
evident that attaching liability under the treatment term is an easier 
standard to meet and would result in an increased percentage of 
successful CERCLA enforcement actions and contribution claims.  
This Article provides two classic real-world scenarios as examples 
to shed light on situations that treatment arranger liability could 
and should be utilized as a litigation tactic. 
I.   DEFINITION OF “TREATMENT” 
To begin, CERCLA § 107(a)(3), which provides the term 
“arranged for . . . treatment,” states in full: 
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a 
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other 
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such 
hazardous substances . . . .25 
The term treatment in CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29), is 
defined the same way as it is under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) § 1004(34).26 
25.  CERCLA § 107(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
26.  See CERCLA § 101(29) (“The terms ‘disposal,’ [sic] ‘hazardous waste,’ [sic] 
and ‘treatment’ shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6903].”); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012) (establishing, through 
RCRA, a statutory scheme for waste management and disposal of hazardous wastes; it 
was enacted in 1976, was a precursor to CERCLA, and thus Congress utilized pieces of 
the program in enacting CERCLA; the difference between the two statutes is that 
CERCLA emphasizes historic and abandoned sites, while RCRA’s scheme is focused 
on currently active facilities as well as future facilities that will need to dispose of 
hazardous wastes).  See also EPA History: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-resource-
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The term ‘treatment’, when used in connection with hazardous 
waste, means any method, technique, or process, including 
neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or 
biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so 
as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste 
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amendable for recovery, 
amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.  Such term 
includes any activity or processing designed to change the 
physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as 
to render it nonhazardous.27 
This definition requires some procedure be conducted to the 
hazardous waste,28 which changes or alters it to be safer or more 
useful.  For instance, if Party A sends a used natural resource to 
Party B, and Party B separates the useful resource from what was 
not useful, Party B’s separation would constitute treatment under 
the RCRA definition that was adopted by CERCLA.  If Party B’s 
operation and treatment of said natural resource causes 
contamination to the property, then Party A would be liable under 
CERCLA since it “arranged for . . . treatment.”29 
II. ANALYSIS OF “TREATMENT” 
A. Legislative History of “Treatment” 
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress was aware 
that when hazardous substances are treated, they have the 
potential to cause a release, disposal, or other contamination that 
may lead to the eventual creation of Superfund sites.30  Therefore, 
arranging for treatment necessitates the strict liability that the 
CERCLA statutory scheme provides in cases where the PRP 
cannot demonstrate the need for apportionment.  The legislative 
history also implements a shorthand definition of treatment, getting 
conservation-and-recovery-act [https://perma.cc/J6RC-QZZ3] (last updated Jan. 5, 
2016) (explaining that RCRA was created to protect “human health and the 
environment from the potential hazards of waste disposal” and reduce the amount of 
generated waste while conserving natural resources and energy).   
27.  42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012). 
28.  It should be noted that the RCRA definition utilizes the term “hazardous 
waste,” rather than “hazardous substance,” which is utilized throughout CERCLA.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012), with CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
29.  CERCLA § 107(a)(3).  See infra Part III for more in-depth hypotheticals. 
30. See ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510, 
VOL. 1 (1983). 
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at the heart of the Congressional intent.31 
Within CERCLA’s legislative history, Congresswoman Niki 
Tsongas of Massachusetts asserted that for the “purposes of this 
[A]ct, Congress declares the manufacture, use, transportation, 
treatment, storage, disposal, and release of hazardous substances 
are ultrahazardous activities.”32  This lends some support to the 
conclusion that Congress intended to utilize the term treatment 
within CERCLA to protect against the numerous liabilities 
associated with the treatment processes.  More importantly, it 
provides evidence that treatment and disposal are not two separate 
acts with differing levels of CERCLA liability, but are equally 
“hazardous acts” in the eyes of Congress.33 
Additionally, within a RCRA Senate Report Summary, the 
term treatment was defined as “any process which changes the 
character of waste so as to render it amendable to further use or 
storage.”34  This Senate Report effectively took the definition of 
treatment from RCRA and condensed it further, demonstrating 
some Congressional intent or support for this definition.35  
However, unlike RCRA’s definition of treatment, which uses the 
word amendable as well as amenable, this Senate Report uses only 
the word amendable.36 
31.  Id. 
32.   See id. 
33.  See id.  The statements made by Tsongas were not refuted by any other 
member of Congress during the hearing on CERCLA.  Id. 
34.  S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 25 (1976). 
35.  See id.  It should be noted that there was nothing within the Senate Report 
that refuted the use of this definition. 
36.  The words have different definitions, and thus convey different meanings.  
Amenable is defined as “capable of submission,” “readily brought to yield, submit, or 
cooperate,” or “willing.”  Amenable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE 
(2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amenable [https://perma.cc/H7L4-
RW5A].  Interestingly, the primary definition of “amenable” is “liable to be brought to 
account,” which does not fit well into the framework of CERCLA.  Id.  On the other 
hand, amend is “to put right,” or “to change or modify for the better.”  Amendable, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, (2015), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/amendable [https://perma.cc/QPJ4-HHHH].  The definitions 
are similar, but it is intriguing, as some courts have emphasized amendable rather than 
amenable in their CERCLA treatment analysis.  See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. 
v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1992) (utilizing 
amendable when quoting RCRA for the definition of treatment and subsequently using 
the term in its analysis on whether a battery generator/recycler treated the batteries 
when breaking them open).  This may be because the word amendable linguistically fits 
the RCRA definition of treatment better than amenable.  The treatment of a 
hazardous substance is relative to “reform[ing]” or “chang[ing] or modify[ing] for the 
better,” rather than making the substance “capable of submission,” or one of the other 
amenable definitions that feel out of place within the definition of treatment.  
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B. How Courts Define “Treatment” 
Courts have defined treatment in a multitude of ways, such as 
making a hazardous substance useable again,37 recovering the 
usable material from the hazardous substance,38 merely reducing 
the hazardous substance in volume, any neutralization process,39 
and any processing of already discarded hazardous substances or 
processing that resulted in such discard.40  This section examines 
numerous courts’ analyses in greater detail; however, there is a 
broad array of possible definitions that can be conditioned to meet 
different sets of fact patterns.  The takeaway is that any analysis has 
included some type of altering of the hazardous substance. 
In United States v. Pesses, defendants sent unusable scrap 
metal to a facility, which was treated and later disposed of at 
another site.41  The unusable scrap metal was a by-product that was 
not usable as intended and was then processed to be made suitable 
for said use once again.42  The court concluded that treatment 
occurred by the processes used to make the metal useable once 
again.43  The processes included “melt[ing], shear[ing], clean[ing], 
crush[ing], saw[ing], band[ing], drill[ing], tapp[ing], briquett[ing], 
and/or bal[ing] it.”44  The court noted that there clearly was 
treatment and disposal evident, as per their RCRA definitions.45 
In Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 
defendants sent spent lead acid batteries for recycling at a lead 
reclamation operator.46  While mentioning disposal, the court here 
clearly held that the defendants arranged for treatment of the lead, 
Amendable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, (2015), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/amendable; Amenable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
ONLINE (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amenable [https://perma 
.cc/H7L4-RW5A]. 
37.  United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 156–57 (W.D. Pa. 1992).   
38.  California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1993).  
39.  Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 
1998); Douglass County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1244, (D. Neb. 1994). 
        40.   142 F.3d at 774.  
41.  Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 156–57.  
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. at 154. 
44.  Id.  
45. Id. at 156.  In the wake of the Burlington Northern decision, the disposal 
analysis here, and in most of the future cases to be covered within this Article may be 
outdated in part.  This specific decision, however, may not have bearing on a CERCLA 
treatment analysis. 
46.  See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 
1269 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
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falling under CERCLA liability.47  Moreover, within a footnote, the 
Eastern District of Virginia noted the definition of treatment 
within RCRA, but more specifically that the company’s process of 
breaking open batteries changed the characteristics of the waste 
“so as to render such waste . . . amendable for recovery.”48 
In a later decision, the Northern District of California in 
California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc. determined that RCRA 
regulations define treatment to include “any process . . . 
designed . . . so as to recover . . . material resources from the 
waste.”49  Defendant, here, was a can manufacturer, the 
manufacturing of which generates solder dross.50  The defendant 
was capable of reclaiming and reusing one-third of the solder, or 
metals, while two-thirds contained “high levels of lead and zinc 
compounds.”51  The defendant sold the solder dross to a metal 
reclamation facility, which reclaimed the reusable portion while 
storing the hazardous portion in drums on the reclamation site.52  
The drums became corroded over time, resulting in creation of a 
Superfund site.53  The court went on to hold that treatment was 
evident in this case since the process of refinement utilized by the 
defendant was intended to “recover material resources from 
waste.”54  This decision, although dating back to 1993, looks to the 
intent of the transaction by the PRP, which would certainly pass 
muster under the Burlington Northern framework for arranger 
liability.55  It should be noted that the court’s holding was not 
limited to treatment arranger liability, as the defendant arranged 
for disposal as well.56 
In Catellus Development Corporation v. United States, the 
defendant sold depleted and no longer useful automobile batteries 
47.  Id. at 1275–76. 
48.  42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., at 1275 n.7 
(E.D. Va. 1992). 
49.  California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 
1993) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 260.10). 
50.  Id. at 577. 
51.  Id.  
52.  Id.  
53.  Id.  
54.  Summer del Caribe, 821 F. Supp. at 580 n.3 (quoting Pesses, 794 F. Supp. at 
157). 
55.  Id.; see generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599 (2009) (holding that in order to find a PRP liable as an arranger for disposal, there 
must be demonstrated proof that the PRP intended to arrange for disposal).   
56.  Summer del Caribe, 821 F. Supp. at 581.   
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to a battery cracking plant.57  Lead was subsequently extracted 
from the batteries at the plant, and the batteries were then 
disposed of at plaintiff’s property.58  The property became 
contaminated with lead, becoming a Superfund site.59  The court 
held that there was no treatment arranger liability here because the 
sale by defendant of the batteries had neither contractual condition 
pertaining to said treatment, nor had the defendant retained any 
ownership interest in the batteries once they were sold to the 
plant.60 
The important aspect of the Catellus district court decision was 
that Congress clearly intended the terms treatment and disposal to 
be separate, thus necessitating separate analyses.61  Provided that 
there is little legislative history, any analysis on this is premised on 
treatment and disposal being two separate terms listed under 
arranger liability within CERCLA § 107(a)(3).62  However, the 
Catellus district court looked to RCRA for the definition of 
treatment summarizing it as “necessarily involv[ing] more than a 
mere transfer of possession and connot[ing] some process designed 
to alter the character or composition of a product.”63  On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Catellus court looked to the RCRA definition, 
utilizing only a piece of the definition for the purposes of this case, 
“amenable for recovery . . . or reduced in volume,” which is relative 
to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s use within Chesapeake.64  
The circuit court upheld the decision on treatment arranger 
liability, but on different grounds that will be discussed further 
within Section C. 
The court in Douglass County v. Gould, Inc. summarized 
treatment under RCRA to be defined as “the process of 
neutralizing a hazardous substance,” concluding that this was not 
the intention of the transaction, which was to sell used plates from 
spent batteries.65  The buyer then used the plates in its smelting 
57.  Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 764, 766 (N.D. Cal. 1993).   
58.  Id.  
59.  Id.  
60.  Id. at 773.   
61.  Id. at 772–73. 
62.  See CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
63.  Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 773. 
64.  Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal 
Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
65.  Douglass County v. Gould, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Neb. 1994). 
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operation, which became a Superfund site.66  The problem with the 
analysis in this case was that the court paid no attention to the 
following phrases within the treatment definition, “amendable for 
recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.”67  While, it 
is appropriate that the court wanted to give increased attention to 
the term neutralizing, this is not the only way to define treatment 
within CERCLA. 
In Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, defendants—consisting of 
battery shops, scrap yards, and battery brokers—sold batteries by 
the pound to a reclamation site.68  Without mentioning specific 
language, the Northern District of Florida, held that “[t]he process 
of breaking open the batteries, recovering the lead groups, washing 
the lead, and disposing of the acid and battery casings amounted to 
‘treatment’ of a hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA.”69  
This is in stark contrast to the Douglass opinion. 
In Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, the Central District of 
Utah also looked to the RCRA definition of treatment, concluding 
that the “extensive chemical reworking” of used oil clearly 
constituted treatment of a hazardous waste under CERCLA.70  The 
defendants in this case sent used motor oil to a refinery to be 
recycled.71  The process of the treatment changed in 1982, but the 
following was deemed treatment by this court: 
after the oil was heated, it was subjected to a distillation process 
to separate the oil into its various components.  During . . . 
distillation, clay was used to removed [sic] carbon from the oil 
and to improve its color.  Given the extensive chemical 
reworking of the used oil at the Ekotek plant, it is impossible to 
say that these processes did not constitute treatment of 
hazardous waste within the meaning of CERCLA.72 
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., a company 
operated a railroad parts foundry, and entered into contracts with 
defendants to buy their used wheel bearings in order to process 
them into new bearings.73  The process included the melting of the 
66.  Id. 
67.  42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012). 
68.  Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1135–36 (N.D. Fla. 1994).   
69.  Id. at 1141. 
70.  Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1528 (C.D. Utah 1995)).   
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 772–73 (4th 
Cir. 1998). 
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metals that make up the bearings, resulting in impurities separating 
from the bearings.74  The court held that the transactional intent of 
both parties was to have the bearings reused in their entirety, and 
thus the transaction was not covered under CERCLA.75 
Nonetheless, the court determined that Congress intended no 
other definition of treatment than what was in RCRA, or they 
would have provided a new definition of treatment within 
CERCLA itself.76  The court held that the plain meaning of the 
term “arranging for . . . treatment”77 “shall have the same meaning 
provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act,”78 which 
provides, “a party arranging for the processing of discarded 
hazardous substance or processing resulting in the discard of 
hazardous substances.”79  This definition is broader than other 
courts have used, as this would include processing of a substance 
that was not hazardous, but becomes so as a result of the given 
process.  With this definition in mind, the question within the case 
then became whether the transaction was for the discard of 
hazardous substances or the sale of “valuable materials.”80  This 
analysis has been used in the past for arranging for disposal, and is 
here being used for arranging for treatment.  In its Burlington 
Northern opinion, the Supreme Court referenced Pneumo Abex in 
a positive light, but the reference did not endorse the treatment 
analysis per se.81 
C. “Intent” to “Arrange for Treatment” 
To be found liable as an arranger for treatment, there must be 
a demonstration of the party’s intent for the hazardous substance 
74.  Id. at 772. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 774. 
77.  CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 
78.  Pneumo Abex, 142 F.3d at 774. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 775. 
81.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 610 (2009).  
“[T]he determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry 
that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a ‘disposal’ or a 
‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall 
within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.”  Id.  See also Freeman v. 
Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 189 F.3d. 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); Pneumo Abex,142 F.3d at 775.  
“[T]here is no bright line between a sale and a disposal under CERCLA.  A party’s 
responsibility . . . must by necessity turn on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the 
transaction.”  United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 
(ND Ill. 1992); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Charmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 
(11th Cir. 1990).  
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to be treated, whether or not this specific intent was explicit within 
the transaction.  Most recently, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Renz,82 the court referenced how treatment should be analyzed in 
arranger liability cases after Burlington Northern.83  This case dealt 
with commercial property that was leased to numerous dry cleaners 
between the years of 1975 to 2008.84  The site was contaminated 
with perchloroethylene (“PCE”), which is a chemical used in dry 
cleaning operations.85  The defendants contended that the claims 
made by plaintiff were based on arranging for treatment, as 
opposed to disposal.86  The court discussed within a footnote that 
Burlington Northern, 
[i]n examining the “ordinary meaning” of the words contained 
in the statute, the Court noted that “the word ‘arrange’ implies 
action directed to a specific purpose[.]”  Based on this 
interpretation, the Court extrapolated that the term “arranged” 
as used in the phrase “arranged for disposal or treatment,” 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), requires a showing of “intentional steps” 
by the putative PRP.  In addition, the Court reasoned that mere 
knowledge of disposal or treatment is not sufficient to establish 
an intention.  Thus, while it is true that the Burlington court was 
discussing the meaning of “arranged” in the context of 
“disposal,” the Court’s reasoning and logic thus apply equally to 
the term “treatment.”87 
The court here went further to analyze treatment using the 
same tests as it would for disposal.  It determined that the Supreme 
Court in Burlington Northern was looking to define the word 
arrange in relation to that of disposal or treatment, and thus the 
requisite mind frame to arrange—that of intent—is the same for 
either of the two.88  Whether this is correct or not, certainly is a 
point of contention that was not clarified within the Supreme 
Court’s Burlington Northern decision. 
Prior to Wells Fargo, the court in Chatham Steel came to a 
similar conclusion—although notably prior to the Burlington 
Northern decision.89  The court found defendants liable for 
arranging for disposal and treatment when the PRP made the 
82.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
83.  Id. at 920. 
84.  Id. at 903. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at 921. 
87.  Id. at 921–22, n.14 (citations omitted). 
88.  Id. 
89.  See Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 1994). 
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“crucial decision” to sell batteries to a recycling facility in the first 
place, making the decision as to “when, and by whom the 
hazardous substances would be treated or disposed.”90 
The Eastern District of California in California Dept. of Toxic 
Substances v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp. also found a defendant 
liable as an arranger for treatment, when the sole purpose of the 
transaction was to treat the “valuable components” of the 
product.91  In this case, the defendant truck parts company brought 
scrap material, including battery parts, to a smelter for recovery of 
lead.92  The defendant retained ownership of the battery parts 
throughout the process of the treatment.93 
More interestingly, the Ninth Circuit opined that there is no 
requirement in treatment cases that there be a contract stating how 
and what treatment will occur.94  The court held “all that is 
necessary is that the treatment be inherent in the particular 
arrangement.”95  In other words, a court can find intent to treat a 
hazardous substance even when it is implicit, rather than explicitly 
laid out by the parties involved.  There is a limit to a finding of 
intent, as the court in Pnuemo Abex concluded that the intent of 
both parties in the relevant transactions was for the product to be 
reused in its entirety, thus the transaction was not covered under 
CERCLA arranger liability.96  In Pneumo Abex defendants 
entered a transaction with Abex Corporation where defendants 
were to give Abex Corporation old wheel bearings in order for the 
Corporation to reuse the entirety of the metals to construct new 
wheel bearings and return to defendants.97  When Abex 
Corporation’s process resulted in the creation of a Superfund site, 
defendants were not held liable as there was no intent by 
defendants to enter into the contract that would result in such.98 
The Circuit Court in Catellus introduced a caveat to treatment 
arranger liability, holding that CERCLA requires the treatment to 
take place at the specific facility at which are the hazardous 
90.  Id. 
91.  Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 298 
F. Supp. 2d 930, 964 (E.D Cal. 2003). 
92.  Id. at 942. 
93.  Id. at 944. 
94.  Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1994). 
95.  Id. 
96.  Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T & D R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
97.  See id. 
98.  Id. 
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substances that are subject to the cleanup action.99  In this case it 
was the eventual arrangement for disposal at Site B that lead to 
contamination, not the arrangement for treatment at the 
intermediary, Site A.100  In other words, Party X is not liable when 
arranging for treatment of a hazardous substance at Facility A if 
Facility A treats the substance, then takes that substance and 
arranges for disposal at Facility B that thereafter becomes a 
Superfund site.  If treatment cases were to become more prominent 
within CERCLA claims, this could be another point of contention 
that has the potential to create a circuit split.  The argument against 
this is that even though the hazardous substance was not disposed 
of on-site, Party X still had the requisite mindset to have the 
substance treated with full knowledge and intent that the resulting 
hazardous waste would be discarded or disposed of by Party Y 
somewhere, whether it be on that site or another owned by a third 
party. 
D. Useful Product Defense 
The useful product defense is available to PRPs when the 
hazardous substance sold can be utilized for its original purpose.101  
Courts have disagreed on the specifics of this defense, especially 
when the sold product was not considered a “hazardous waste” at 
the time of the sale.  This is especially true in cases for mining 
property where the hazardous waste was not present until after the 
mining operation began or concluded.102 
The court in Summer del Caribe, Inc., characterized the useful 
product defense as only applicable when there is a sale of a new 
product, manufactured specifically for sale and used for its ordinary 
purpose.103  The defense has been readily rejected by courts when 
the purpose of the sale is to treat or get rid of a waste or by-
product.104 
The Northern District of Florida, in Chatham Steel, disagreed 
with the Catellus district court analysis, which had looked to a 
99.  Catellus, 34 F.3d at 753.   
100.  Id. 
101.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 609–10 
(2009). 
102.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (E.D. 
Wash. 2011).   
103.  Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
104.  Id.; see also United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1992) 
(explaining that CERCLA liability can attach to those who do not own or control the 
material, as liability attaches also to those who arranged for treatment or disposal).   
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product’s “productive use” rather than whether it was a “useful 
product.”105  As per the Chatham Steel case, a product could be of 
“productive use” for recycling, although not a “useful product” in 
terms of the originally intended purpose of the product.106  The 
court in Chatham Steel decided to utilize the useful product 
analysis from Pesses and Chesapeake, rather than the Catellus 
district court test.107 
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., the court—in a 
post Burlington Northern analysis—explained that the useful 
product defense does not apply if the plaintiff can show that the 
product or substance transacted for “has the characteristic of waste 
at the time it is delivered to another party.”108  The court 
distinguished the Cadillac Fairview and Catellus Circuit Court 
treatment analyses by explaining that the transactions within those 
cases involved a product, which had the “characteristic of waste” at 
the point of delivery.109 
In Pakootas, plaintiff Teck Cominco alleged that the State of 
Washington qualified as an arranger when it leased public lands for 
ore mining, a process that generated waste rock and tailings.110  The 
court concluded that there was a valid useful product defense here, 
since the mines “did not have the ‘characteristic of waste’” until the 
plaintiff mined them to produce such waste.111  In Cadillac 
Fairview, the product sold was previously contaminated styrene,112 
while in Catellus it was spent batteries.113  The court concluded that 
since the mines were not a “hazardous waste when the State 
entered into the contracts,” the purpose of the State in the 
contracts could not have been “to dispose of or treat hazardous 
105.  Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 766; Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 
1130, 1141 (N.D. Fla. 1994).   
106.  Chatham Steel, 858 F. Supp. at 1141. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Pakootas, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (quoting Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. 
Real Estate Tr., 647 F. 3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2011)).   
109.  Id. at 1277. 
110.  Id. at 1270. 
111.  Id. at 1277, 1281; see Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States, 41 
F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 766. 
112.  “Styrene is used predominately in the production of polystyrene plastics and 
resins.  Styrene is also used as an intermediate in the synthesis of materials used for ion 
exchange resins and to produce copolymers.”  Styrene Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/hlthef/styrene.html [https://perma.cc/JHM3-
2S8S] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
113.  Id.; Catellus, 828 F. Supp. at 764–65. 
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waste.”114  Treatment by the mining companies was the peripheral 
result of a new and unused product.115 
The court in Pakootas clearly misunderstood the purpose of 
the CERCLA statute when coming to its decision on the matter of 
treatment and disposal.116  As Teck Cominco asserted in its brief, 
the State arranged for treatment and disposal of hazardous waste 
when it leased the land, as the “waste in the form of tailings and 
waste rock is inherent to the mining and milling processes,” which 
the State intended Teck Cominco to perform.117  The State 
intended to enter into the contract so that Teck Cominco would 
separate the ore from the waste rock and treat the ore, which 
generated tailings that were disposed of.118  There is no other 
purpose for the State to lease the mines to Teck Cominco than to 
arrange for the mining, which results in the treatment and 
subsequent disposal of hazardous waste.119  This is not a case of 
mere knowledge by the defendant, but rather one where intent is 
implicit within the transaction.120  Even if the court asserted that 
there was no hazardous waste to treat, it must at least admit that 
the contract arranged for the disposal of future waste at the site. 
More in line with a typical useful product analysis, the Ekotek 
court claimed that the “defense focuses only upon whether the 
product is still fit for its original purpose.”121  The standard applies 
to not just disposal, but also treatment as well,122 and could easily 
be applied to the necessary processing of a mineral at a refinery. 
E. Retention of Ownership 
To be held liable for arranging for the disposal or treatment of 
a hazardous substance it does not matter whether the liable party 
“retain[ed] ownership of the materials” they shipped away or sold, 
or whether they had control of the handling or storage by the 
treating or disposing party.123  In sum, a party can be liable as an 
arranger for treatment even if it did not receive any materials back 
after the treatment occurred.  Ownership of the hazardous 
114.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1281. 
115.  Id. 
116.  See id. 
117.  Id. at 1270. 
118.  Id. at 1271 n.2. 
119.  See id. at 1270. 
120.  See id. 
121.  Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1527 (C.D. Utah 1995). 
122.  Id. 
123.  United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 157 (W.D. Pa. 1992).   
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substance after treatment is covered under a different CERCLA 
liability analysis.124 
The court in Cadillac Fairview held that for arranger liability 
to attach, it does not matter if the arranger owned the hazardous 
substance, or was the one who disposed of or treated it, but merely 
that the person or entity arranged for treatment or disposal.125  The 
court used the terms disposal and treatment interchangeably within 
this analysis, as the emphasis was more on the word arrange.126  In 
agreement, the court in Summer del Caribe explained that a person 
or company could be liable even when it did not own and decide 
how to specifically treat or dispose of said product.127  The only 
factor necessary to attach liability is a party’s intended treatment or 
disposal when the product was sold.128 
III. REAL WORLD SCENARIOS 
There are many different real-world scenarios that can call for 
the use of a treatment arranger argument; however, for purposes of 
this Article, I propose two examples that demonstrate such.  The 
main point is that treatment arranger liability may be easier to 
argue in some cases than that of disposal arranger liability. 
A. Battery Casings 
Party A is an auto parts store (“Store A”), which received 
automotive batteries from customers via trade-ins.129  Store A’s 
policy for dealing with these spent batteries was to crack them 
open, and then to sell them to a battery cracking plant operated by 
Company B.130  Company B then extracted and smelted the lead 
from the batteries, taking on ownership and control of these 
batteries.131  Company B then washed and crushed the battery 
casings, to be stored on a truck to be dumped on another end of the 
property owned by Company B.  The casings contained lead, 
124.  See CERCLA § 107(a). 
125.  Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
126.  See id. 
127.  California v. Summer del Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 
1993). 
128.  Id. 
129.  A majority of the facts presented within this scenario derive from case law, 
with few changes.  See generally Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
130.  See id. at 749. 
131.  See id. at 749–50. 
2016] CERCLA: “TREATMENT” ARRANGER LIABILITY 443
contaminating the property that soon became a Superfund site.  
EPA issued a unilateral administrative order under CERCLA § 
106(a) for Company B to cleanup the site, which it did.132 
The present case has arisen out of a contribution action taken 
by Company B under CERCLA § 113(f) to mitigate its impact 
from joint and several liability under CERCLA.133  The premise 
here is that Company B could assert that Store A entered into a 
contractual relationship in order to dispose of the hazardous 
substance, which it did effectively.  The problem with this argument 
is that it is much harder to demonstrate to a court of law that Store 
A had the intent to dispose of the hazardous substance, as it could 
argue that the contract was for the sale of a useful product, and that 
if anything, they had knowledge of the eventual disposal of the lead 
inside.  The more effective litigation tactic here would be to assert 
that Store A entered into the transactions with Company B 
intending for Company B to treat the batteries, as there are 
minimal uses that Company B can conjure up for spent car 
batteries.  The treatment here takes place whenever Company B 
engages in any actions to the batteries, which effectively separates 
the non-hazardous from the hazardous substance or diminishes the 
hazardous substances within, or connected to the non-hazardous 
substances in any respect.134 
B. Transformer/Barrel Reconditioning 
Another instance where an arranger treatment analysis would 
be practical is where Company A transacts with Company B to 
recondition or repair transformers,135 barrels, or some other 
132.  Pursuant to CERCLA § 106(a) a unilateral administrative order works as 
follows: 
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the 
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he 
may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as 
may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of the 
United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction 
to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may 
require.  The President may also, after notice to the affected State, take other 
action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as 
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment. 
CERCLA § 106(a). 
133.  CERCLA § 113(f). 
134.  See supra Part I. 
135.  Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 144 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(The type of transformer being referenced “‘step[s] down’ the voltage of electricity as it 
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product in order for Company A to then reuse said product.  For 
example, a transformer is filled with oil, in order to keep all of the 
parts lubricated and properly working.136  When delivering the 
transformers they are often stripped of “free flowing oil,” leaving a 
coating of oil on the inside edges.137  The oils within the transformer 
may, and often do, contain polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCB”), as 
was the case in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co.138  
During repair of the transformer, PCBs could leak out and create a 
Superfund site.139 
The key to this is that the reconditioning desired by Company 
A was with the intent that Company B remove any hazardous 
substance from the product, such as PCB liquids lining the 
product.140  The act of removing the hazardous substance is 
treatment under CERCLA, and therefore Company A should be 
found liable if Company B’s property becomes a Superfund site.  
Intent for disposal of that same hazardous substance is further 
attenuated from the purpose of the transaction than was the 
treatment of the product; therefore the easier argument to make is 
for CERCLA treatment arranger liability.  It should be noted that 
this may not work in a case like Consolidation Coal, where the 
power company sold the PCB contaminated transformers as a 
useful product, as there is no requisite intent to have the PCBs 
themselves disposed of, or even treated, for that matter.141 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, a CERCLA treatment analysis is different from 
that of disposal, and the legislative intent coupled with case law 
clearly differentiates the two terms.  The definition of treatment 
under RCRA includes a vast array of situations, encompassing 
anytime a seller of a product intends for the product to be treated 
in some capacity, whether it be by separating the hazardous waste 
moves from power plants to end users. . . . [T]ypically contains an enclosed, vacuum-
sealed external tank, an internal iron core, and coils consisting of copper or aluminum 
windings wrapped in cellulose insulation that tightly surround the core.”). 
136.  Id. at 144. 
137.  Id. at 145. 
138.  Id. at 144. 
139.  See id. 
140.  See generally Consolidation Coal, 781 F.3d 129 (holding by way of a strict 
arrange for disposal analysis that the seller of transformers was not liable for sale to a 
second party who then reconditioned and sold to others, creating a Superfund site at 
the reconditioning party’s property). 
141.  See id. 
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from the non-hazardous, or by making the waste “amenable for 
recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.”142  The 
seller does not need to have control over the treatment of the 
hazardous waste.  The purpose of the arranger provision within 
CERCLA § 107(a) is not just to find a party liable for arranging for 
the disposal of a hazardous substance that results in a hazardous 
waste spill, but to also hold such a party liable if they arrange for 
treatment of a hazardous substance at a facility.  As there are 
currently few CERCLA treatment arranger related cases, an 
increase would result in an increase in successful enforcement 
actions.  A multitude of successful treatment arranger cases has the 
potential to speed up the litigation process in the short term, and 
culminate in a boost in settlements with PRPs in the long term. 
142.  42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2012).
